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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
By HOMER H. CLARK, JR.
Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law
INTRODUCTION

The year 1957 saw relatively few reported cases in Colorado dealing
with domestic relations.' Most of these were of little importance as precedents. The most significant legal event in this field was the passage
of a comprehensive set of amendments to the statutes dealing with
divorce2 and annulment.' The divorce bill was vetoed by Governor
McNichols but the annulment bill became law.4 It is to be hoped that
the divorce bill will be reintroduced, passed and approved by the governor, since it makes many badly needed reforms. Both bills were drawn
by Colorado Bar Association committees, who should receive great credit
for the skillful execution of a difficult job. A detailed examination of
the new annulment statute is outside the scope of this paper, but some
reference will be made to its provisions in the appropriate section below.'
DIVORCE

AND

SEPARATE MAINTENANCE

Two important cases arose in this area of domestic relations. In one,
Carrollv. Carroll,6 the supreme court gave Colorado lawyers some muchneeded light on what constitutes mental cruelty in this state. The husband was plaintiff and alleged in his bill of particulars that his wife
had refused to attend social functions, church or to entertain in their
home, had disagreed and argued with the plaintiff, had failed to keep
house properly, and had been guilty of other conduct causing the plaintiff humiliation and distress. The trial court denied the divorce on the
ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish cruelty. The supreme
court reversed, saying that the proof did show cruelty, rather than mere
incompatibility. Although the kinds of conduct which may constitute
cruelty vary so widely that no two cases are just alike, this opinion does
contain some general language which is worth quoting because it suggests that the Colorado Supreme Court is willing to grant divorces for
conduct which does not meet the standards of cruelty which some more
strict courts might require:
"So far as peace of mind, happiness and good health is concerned, mental cruelty may be the most devastating type of
cruelty. As was said in an earlier case, it is a refined cruelty
which is sharper than the knife and more brutal than the fist.
Married persons should be responsible to their spouses for the
natural consequences of their words and actions, and if the conduct of defendant in this case was such as to cause disturbances
with plaintiff's ability to carry on his chosen profession, and in
addition thereto, bring about an impairment of health and rob
him of his peace of mind, then it is something more than mere
incompatibility. In some instances, it might be difficult to pinOnly cases decided during the calendar year 1957 will be discussed in this article.
2 House Bill No. 70, First Regular Session, Forty-first General Assembly (1957).
3 House Bill No. 77, First Regular Session, Forty-first General Assembly (1957).
4 Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1957, e. 129, §§ 1-10, amending Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 46-3-1 through 46-3-9 (1953).
5 See note 34, infra.
6 311 P.2d 709 (Colo. 1957).
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point mental cruelty and inferences may be allowed. Scrutiny
of defendant's testimony discloses a clear inference that she felt
herself superior in many ways to plaintiff, and that her environment was below her mental caliber. She admitted that she
understood that plaintiff's nature was unusually sociable and
responsive, and this leads to the inference that he is of a sensitive nature, and this should be a strong factor in determining
whether there has been cruelty within the meaning of our
divorce statute. This does not create a dual standard, that is,
one standard for the cultured and refined, and another for the
unrefined. While the state and society is always an interested
party in the maintenance of the marriage contract, it is not so
exacting as to insist that the marriage relation in all events
should continue, or that a home be maintained under circumstances that are more detrimental to society than a divorce." 7
In the writer's opinion, this decision takes a commendable step
toward bringing the official definition of cruelty into line with what the
trial courts are actually doing in many parts of the state. In the process,
it does come near to assimilating mental cruelty to incompatibility.
The second important case is Rodgers v. Rodgers,' which held that
permanent alimony and a division of property, granted some months
after the divorce decree became final, were outside the trial court's
jurisdiction. The supreme court stated that such relief must be given at,
or perhaps before, the time of the final decree. At the present writing,
a petition for rehearing in this case has been granted,' so that any comment would be premature. Whatever the result, the decision will be
most significant'for the administration of Colorado's divorce law.
One other divorce case10 held that the husband was domiciled in
Colorado, upon facts showing some contacts with other states. The same
case held that in awarding alimony the trial court should consider the
husband's existing income, not what he might expect to earn in the
future.
The single separate maintenance case decided during the year11 held
that the wife's action should not have been dismissed when she failed,
for lack of funds, to appear in Colorado for the taking of her deposition.
She was living in Chicago, and the court properly said that the information sought by the deposition could be obtained in other ways which
would not impose the expense and hardship of a special trip from
Chicago to Denver.
HUSBAND AND WIFE

The two cases on this subject were of little importance. One decision reiterated the Colorado rule that a conveyance is not presumed to
be in fraud of a spouse, in the absence of evidence to that effect. 12 Conversely, it was held in the other case that a wife could set aside a conveyance where it was in fraud of her rights.1 3
7 Id. at 711.

9 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 493 (1957).
9 10 Colo. Bar Asi'n Adv. Sh. 19 (1957).
10 Watson v. Watson, 310 P.2d 554 (Colo. 1957).
11 Manning v. Manning, 10 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 70 (Colo,
12 Bushner v. Bushner, 134 Colo. 509, 307 P.2d 204 (1957).
13 Zingone v. Zingone, 314 P.2d 304 (Colo. 1957).
S

1957).
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PARENT AND CHILD

The troublesome problem of the effect of a foreign custody decree
4
arose once in 1957. In Evans v. Evans"
the spouses had been divorced
in Wyoming, custody being given to the wife, who lived in Wyoming,
for nine months of the year and to the husband for the other three
months. The child's father remarried four years later and moved to
Denver. In 1956 he had the child under the Wyoming decree and refused
to return her to the mother at the end of the summer. The mother filed
a petition for habeas corpus in the Denver district court, the father
counterclaimed asking that custody be granted to him, and the court
denied the writ, giving custody to the father. The apparent ground
for the decision was the child's desire to remain with her father. The
supreme court reversed, and directed that custody be given to the mother.
It is not entirely clear what reason the court relied upon in reaching
this result. The supreme court first objected to the trial court's failure
to make findings as to the child's domicile, as to any change of circumstances since the Wyoming decree, or as to the mother's unfitness. The
court also referred to the fact that the father was in violation of the
Wyoming decree. It found that the child was domiciled in Wyoming
at the time the petition was filed.
If the decision stands for the proposition that there is no jurisdiction
to decide custody where the child is domiciled outside the state, even
though one parent is domiciled in Colorado and though both parents
are personally before the Colorado court, it may be very doubtful. No
Colorado statute governs on this point, and the common law authorities
are in some conflict. The Restatement of Conflict of Laws seems to take
the position that only the courts of the child's domicile have jurisdiction.15 The California case of Sampsell v. Superior Court"6 holds that
more than one state may have jurisdiction, and that the state of the
child's temporary residence may grant a custody decree. The United
States Supreme Court has held that a custody decree is entitled to full
faith and credit only if the parents have been personally served in the
jurisdiction granting the decree, regardless of the child's domicile." On
this point, therefore, the Evans opinion is unsatisfactory, since it fails
to consider the various authorities and choose unequivocally between
them.
There are two other well established grounds for the decision, however: (1) There was no finding that conditions had so changed since
the Wyoming decree as to justify a change in custody," and (2) The
father, who was asking for the change, was violating the Wyoming
decree in keeping the child beyond the three-month period. The Colorado Supreme Court in other cases has properly refused to grant a change
in custody in such circumstances in order to discourage divorced spouses
from shopping around for a favorable forum, such activities being
14 314 P.2d 291 (Colo. 1957).
15 Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 146 (1934): "Upon the legal separation of the
parents, by divorce or otherwise, custody of their child can be given to either parent
by a court of the state of domicile of the child." And see Id. § 117 (1934). But see
Id. § 148 (1934): "in any state into which the child comes, upon proof that the custodian of the child is unfit to have control of the child, the child may be taken from
him and given while in the state to another person."
16 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948).
17 May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953), 26 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 205 (1954).
isRestatement, Conflict of Laws § 147, comment a (1934).
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extremely detrimental to the child's welfare.)
.11either of these two
grounds were the basis for the Evans case, there could be no question
of its correctness.
Quintrall v. Goldsmith21 settled a hard question of adoption law,
holding that a child who had been adopted twice could not inherit from
his first adoptive parents, in spite of a provision in the first adoption
decree that the adoptive parents could not disinherit him. The supreme
court found the provision valid because the adoption occurred before
the passage of the statute allowing the disinheriting of adopted children,' but the court said that the second adoption decree divested the
first adoptive parents of all legal rights and obligations. The court
recognized that there is authority to the contrary,22 but chose not to
follow it on the ground that it would create great difficulties in the
drafting of wills and distribution of property on death. The decision
seems to be in accord with the rationale of adoption, although it reads
into the first adoption decree a provision not found there,23 and gives
'9

Crocker v. Crocker, 122 Colo. 49, 219 P.2d 311 (1950).

For general discussion of

these problems, see Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance l[aw Across State Lines,
10 Law & Contemp. Prob. 819, 831 (1944): Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 345 (1953).
20 134 Colo. 410. 306 P.2d 246 (1957).
21 Colo. R1ev. Stat. Ann.
§ 152-2-4 (1953). the critical portion of which was
enacted in 1941. Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1941, c. 23., § 16.
22 E.g., In re Egley's Estate. 16 Wash. 2d 681. 134 P.2d 943 (1943).
23 The court states that the first adoption decree should be read to mean that
the adoptive parents must not disinherit the child "as long as the Viltses (the adoptive parents) stood in loco parentis." 134 Colo. at 416, 306 l'.2d at 248.
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the second decree the effect of cutting off rights accrued under the first,
without any language in the second decree explicitly so stating. The
willingness of the court to read provisions into decrees in this case,
where the result is to prevent an inheritance by an adopted child should
be contrasted with the court's reluctance to give effect to the express
words of the adoption statute where the result would be to protect an
adopted child's rights of inheritance.24 In this state as in others, the
courts have been far too slow to place the adopted child on an equal
footing with natural children where rights of inheritance are involved.
Two dependency cases of 1957 should be noted briefly. In the first,
Ortega v. Portales,2 the mother of an illegitimate child filed a dependency petition, alleging the father had failed to support the child, who
was born some eight years before. The juvenile court, where the petition was filed, held that the action was barred by the general three-year
statute of limitations. 6 The supreme court reversed, holding that the
gravamen of the action was the failure to support, that there was a continuing breach of duty, and the action was thus not barred by the
statute. Unfortunately, the supreme court failed to state whether the
juvenile court could order support retroactive to the child's birth, or
only over the preceding three years. This case also apparently means
that non-support is a proper ground for a dependency action, and that
the court is repudiating sub silentio its own remarks in Kearney v. Blue27
and other recent cases,28 to the effect that a child who is not being supported by its parents is not "dependent" as the statute defines that term.
The other dependency case, Geisler v. People," held that it is a

jurisdictional requirement, for dependency and contributory dependency actions, 30 that the child involved, as well as the petitioner, reside
in the county where the petition is filed.
1
Two other cases must be briefly mentioned. One, Tucker v. People,"
dealt with jurisdiction of county court in criminal non-support cases.
Rehearing has been granted in the action,3 2 so that comment would be
premature. The other case merely affirmed a trial court's refusal to
modify a custody decree, finding no abuse of discretion, 3 and is of
slight significance as a precedent.
MARRIAGE

AND

ANNULMENT

As has been indicated, the year saw an entirely new annulment
statute in Colorado, 34 dealing not only with the procedure in such cases,
but also with the substantive law of marriage. A comprehensive and
24 See, e.g., Russell v. Jordan, 58 Colo. 445, 147 Pac. 693 (1915), which the court
cites as holding that the adopted child can inherit from, but not through, his adoptive
parents. There is room for argument that this rule has been changed by the 1941
amendments to the intestacy law, now found in Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 152-2-4 (1953),
but this citation of Russell seems to indicate that the supreme court thinks the
Russell rule is still law in Colorado. For full discussion of this problem see Note.
26 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 65, 68 (1953).
25 134 Colo. 537. 307 P.2d 193 (1.957).
26 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 87-1-9 (1953), covering "all other actions of every kind
for which no other period of limitation is provided by law."
27 134 Colo. 217, 301 P.2d 515 (1956).
28 See Carrera v. Kelley, 131 Colo. 421. 283 P.2d 162 (1955); and Foxgruber v. Hansen, 128 Colo. 511, 265 P.2d 233 (1954).
29 308 P.2d 1000 (Colo. 1957).
30 The court held that actions under both the dependency statute, Colo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 22-1-9 (1953), and the contributory dependency statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 22-7-2 (1953) are to be governed by the same rules, with respect to residence of the
child. The court seems to use the term "residence" as synonymous with "domicile"
in this case.
31 9 Colo. TBar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 527 (1957).
32 10 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv, Sh. 19 (1957).
Strakosch v. Benwell, 310 P.2d 720 (Colo. 1957).
e4 Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1957, c. 129. See note 5, supra.
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exhaustive definition of void and voidable marriages was enacted. 5 The
statute making miscegenation a crime and making miscegenous marriages void was repealed. 6 Other important changes in Colorado law
were made." The statute raises several complex questions which cannot
be discussed in this limited space.
The only case on marriage during the year was Archina v. People,8
a murder prosecution. In the trial court, the defendant's wife was
allowed to testify against him, and the question was raised on appeal
whether she was to be considered his wife for purposes of the statute
giving him the privilege of excluding her evidence- 9 The supreme court
held she was not, apparently limiting its definition of "wife" to apply
solely to this precise question. 4 The parties had been married by a civil
35 Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1957, c. 129 §§ 1 and 3, which will eventually be found
in Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 46-3-1 and 46-3-3 (1953).
36 Although the legislature did not expre.,sly repeal Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 90-1-2
1953 making marriages between negroes and whiies void, this section was repealed by
implication, since Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1957, c. 129, § 3 provides that "A marriage is void only if one or more of the following conditions existed at the time of the
marriage,'' anui the listed conditions do not inclide miscegenation.
overruled, so that a
37 E.g., Valdez v. Shaw, 100 Colo. 101, 66 P.2d 325 (1937) w\,as
child of a vo.d or voidable marriage is now legitimate, whether or not hs parents get
an annulment. See (olo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1957, c. 1'9, § 5. And Owen v. Owen,
127 Colo. 358. 257 P.2d 581 (1953), requiring personal service in annulment suits, has
been overruled by Colo. Laws 1st ,eg. Sess. 1957, c. 129, § S. The new statute labels
annulment an action in rem.
:8 307 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1957).
29 The statute provides that a wife shall not be examined for or against her
husband without his consent. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 153-1-7 (1953).
40 The court said, in concluding its discussion of the point: "Our decision here
is limited to an appl:caticn of ihe statute to the facts as disclosed by this record."
307 P.2d at 1094. Presumably this means that the court was not making a general
judgment about the validity of the marriage.

42
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ceremony in Italy, there being some doubt as to just where in that
country it was performed. But a marriage ceremony seems to have been
performed, and probably made the parties man and wife by Italian law.4
At least one reason for the marriage was to enable the husband to get
into the United States. The marriage was never consummated and a
later religious ceremony which had been contemplated never occurred.
In reaching its result, the court relied on two federal cases in which
marriages of this sort, contracted in order to enable one of the parties
to enter the United States, had been held to violate the immigration
laws. One of these cases held that no marriage had occurred, 42 but the
other refused to pass on that issue, holding merely that a marriage of'
this kind amounted to a conspiracy to enter the United States by frau(. 4 3
The Archina case assumes, without discussion, that marriage is
"divisible," that is, that a man and woman may be married for some
purposes and not others. The case must mean that although the relationship could not be annuled, 4 the parties could not be considered
man and wife for purposes of requiring one to give evidence against
the other. The reason for reaching this result, though not articulated
plainly, seems to have been that a statute designed to protect confidential communications between spouses (and thus insure marital harnony) 42 has no application where the relationship so lacks affection and
harmony that there is nothing to protect." ; Such a holding has the virtue
of construing the statute by reference to its purpose, but is open to the
objection that it imparts uncertainty to a status where certainty is desirable. There are so many other sources of uncertainty, however, that
41At one point the court says there is doubt whether the parties ever entered
a valid civil marriage, but later it is conceded. that they did. 307 P.2d at 1091, 1092.
The opinion could be a good deal clearer on this point. The court does not discuss the
conftiet of laws question.
42 United States v. Rubinstein, 151 P.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).
43 United States v. Lutwak, 344 U.S. 604 (1953). This case does not support the
rtsult reached in Archina.
44. Although there are few cases with facts like this one, there are several where
the "marriage" was entered into for an ulterior motive, such as to give a child a
name, to enable one of the parties to get or keep a job, or for other reasons. The great
majority of these cases hold the marriages valid. They are collected in a note, Sham
Marriages, 20 Univ. of Chi. L. Rev. 710 (1953). It is too bad that the Archina opinion
did not at least mention these decisions. A recent English case held a marriage valid
where contracted solely for the purpose of enabling one of the spouses to emigrate to
England. Kraft v. Silver, [19551 1 Weekly L. R. 728. noted in 69 Harv. L. Rev. 768 (1956).
in this case, the question arose in connection with the wife's suit for divorce. The
fact that the parties did not intend to perform the usual marital duties does not
invalidate the marriage in most cases. A leading case so holding is Estate of Duncan,
87 Colo. 149, 285 Pac. 757 (1930).
45 That this is the policy underlying the marital privilege, see McCormick.
Evidence 168, 169, 179, 150 (1954).
46 "It
is inconceivable that the legislature, in adopting the above statute, intended to preserve inviolate such strange relationships as that existing between Rose
and the defendant. That relationship was a coid, inanimate, lifeless relationship which
had its beginning and end in a preliminary civil contract, in the minds of the parties
amounting to nothing more than an agreement to marry at some time in the future.
This defendant cannot use this statute, designed and intended to protect and preserve
an ifistitution and status that from time immemorial has been the very foundation of
civilization and survival of the hinman race, as a shield to escape the consequences of
his unlawful acts." 307 P.2d at 1092. The peculiar thing about this policy argument
is that in many American jurisdictions, the privilege survives divorce, where the
relationship has become even more "cold, inanimate, lifeless" than it was in Archina.
And presumably it would exist, notwithstanding a separation, where no divorce had
occurred. See McCormick, Evidence 178 (1954). Perhaps the Archina opinion stands
for the principle that the privilege ends whenever the marriage is or has become an
empty relationship, in which the parties are not living affectiowtely together as
husband and wife normally do.

SACHS-LIWLOR- CORPORATIOn SEALS- ALPINE 5-3422

JANUARY-FEBRUARY,

1958

DICTA

perhaps it is illusory to think that people are entitled to have the law
governing their marital relationships stated plainly, in a manner intelligible to laymen.47 The new annulment statute is an attempt to provide an exhaustive list of the defects which impair the validity of marriages, thus providing a measure of certainty. Perhaps this statute,
which does not refer to any such defect as existed in the Archina case,
would be held to overrule that decision. 41 It certainly does seem to say,
in effect, that all marriages are valid except those labeled void or voidable by reason of the named defects. It is hard to escape the conclusion
that it was intended to establish a binding definition for all purposes.
47 See, e.g., Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957), in which a marriage had
ended for purposes of remarriage, but still existed as far as the husband's duty to
support his wife was concerned.
48 Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1957, c. 129 §§ 1 and 3.
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